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Johnston, of course, would say in reply to such objections, that in the psy­
chological-experiential dimension, theological distinctions are bypassed or 
transcended. And in part I agree. Yet, can an experience of “detachment” 
nourished while sitting upon a Christian pillow of personal communion with a 
Divine Spirit be genuinely equated or meaningfully compared with one which 
discovers the Void to be the glorious essence of all reality—available on the Zen 
pillow? Not easily I think. Nor does the author himself really believe so; for 
throughout the book he insists that Christian mysticism is intrinsically and 
inherently an experience of the Divine Trinity.
Other examples could be given, but these make my main points. First, there 
is no clear, consistent delineation either of the mystical experience as a dis­
tinguishable entity, or of Christian-Zen likeness and difference. Second, despite 
an obviously wide acquaintance with world religions, a genuinely ecumenical 
sympathy, and a deep religious awareness—as well as some personal experience 
of Zen-type meditation on the part of the author—there is in this book no 
genuine encounter between Buddhist and Christian mystical substance and ex­
perience, let alone a “reconciliation.*’ The best that is produced is a series of 
perceptive insights and rough parallels, suitable for an introductory compara­
tive mystical treatise. But there is no fundamental intersection of thought or 
interaction of religious essences.
And why is this the case? It is because the author has never had a truly 
existential encounter with Buddhism. He himself, in the core of his being, has 
always been and still is sitting firmly on his Christian pillow—though he has 
allowed his mind and imagination to journey interestedly and interestingly into 
the ways of inner Buddhist spirituality. And this points up a key question for all 
of us who, like him, have essayed to study-experience a religious way of life which 
is different from our own faith-accepted one: How genuine or veridical is any 
such experience, short of conversion to the “experienced” faith’s ideas and 
values?
Winston L. King
ABSOLUTES NICHTS: Zur Grundlegung des Dialogs zwischen Buddhismus 
und Christentum. By Hans Waldenfels. Freiburg, Herder-Verlag, 1976. 
222 pp.
This publication, the result of many years of intensive work, is not only a study 
of Nishitani Keiji’s religious philosophy, its Buddhist origins and essence, it 
deals also with the development of the so-called Kyoto school, whose outstand­
ing exemplar his philosophy represents at the present time, and with the
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spiritual background of that philosophy in the east and west. The bibliography 
shows that the present book has been preceded by a number of shorter publica­
tions on different aspects of this theme, which are here enlarged, deepened, and 
coordinated in an impressive manner. It consists of three parts: “Background,” 
“Nishitani Kciji and the Philosophy of Sunyata,” and “Fundamentals for 
Dialogue.”
In his sketch of the historical background, Waldenfels makes reference to the 
homelessness of the Buddha, his silence in respect to the question of metaphysics, 
the concept of anatman, the doctrine of dependent co-origination, and, further, 
to Nagaijuna and the Madhyamika philosophy. Then follows a brief description 
of the history and essence of Zen Buddhism, culminating in a characterization of 
Nishida Kitaro’s way of thinking, from his standpoint of “Pure Experience” 
to that of the “Self-identity of Absolute Contradictions.” In his description of 
Nishitani’s religious and philosophical heritage, the author makes mention of 
the positions of other representatives of the Kyoto school, and compares them 
with those of Western philosophers, particularly Nietzsche and Heidegger.
This broad comparative method is then used in the discussion of Nishitani’s 
sunyata philosophy. This, the main part of the book, is again divided into three 
sections. In the first, he deals with the “impulses” behind Nishitani’s thinking; 
in the second, with the way from “nihilistic despair” to “empty hands,” the 
last stage in the Ten Oxherding Pictures; in the third, he develops the “evalua­
tion of world, history, and man” which results from the “aspect of the Void.” 
The central focus of the present analysis is directed to one of Nishitani’s chief 
works, What is Religion? (ShQky9 to wa nanika), which has been appearing in 
English translation in the Eastern Buddhist since 1967 (the final chapter appears 
in this issue). For central concepts such as Nothingness and “the discrimination 
of nondiscrimination,” Waldenfels makes use of expositions by Abe Masao and 
Ueda Shizuteru. He also quotes from the works of Buddhist thinkers such as 
Suzuki Daisetz and Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, and Christian thinkers represented by 
Tillich and Rahner, and Takizawa and Yagi in Japan. In this way, we are 
given not only a picture of Nishitani’s philosophy, but a glimpse of the tendencies 
of the Kyoto school as a whole and its role in the ongoing East-West dialogue.
The universality and orientation to the actual of Nishitani’s sunyata philos­
ophy is already present in its point of departure, in the dilemma in which 
religious man finds himself: burdened by modem science and technology, he 
is in danger of falling into nihilism or a no less destructive idolatrous scientism. 
Convinced that Christianity and Western thought are unable to overcome this 
situation, Nishitani believes a solution is to be found in the Way of Zen, which 
leads through the “great doubt” to the “true Self” of enlightenment, and to 
the “wondrous being” therein.
The presentation of this Zen thinking, which would transcend the subject-
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object dichotomy of consciousness-thinking, is no easy matter from the formal 
aspect alone. More to the point here, however, the contradictions in the 
assertions the author makes about the “inexpressible” become incomprehen­
sible when he attempts to draw the material, practical conclusions of Zen-type 
thinking for the understanding of nature and history and the role God and man 
have to play therein. Yet this failure to provide an intelligible reconstruction of 
Nishitani’s philosophy is perhaps not to be laid entirely on the author alone. 
It probably has its cause in the nature of what it is he is attempting to represent 
here. Ultimately, only falling silent and maintaining that silence would cor­
respond to the inexpressible. But that would mean that at the same time a 
setback for the true Self and its Transcendence, the promotion of which belongs 
to the basic interest, each in their own respective manners, of both the Buddhist 
Nishitani and the Christian Waldenfels.
That this common interest is endangered is what Waldenfels seeks to convey 
in the proposals which make up the closing part of his book, “Fundamentals 
for Dialogue.” As he sees it, these fundamenub are to be found in two direc­
tions. On the one hand, they consist in hermeneutical considerations, this in 
view of the necessity of combining in a dialectical manner positive statements 
about the existence and essence of God and the essence of man with the ac­
knowledgement of the impossibility of such statements, and also in an under­
standing of mystical texts as “mystagogy,” this as a guide to existential praxis 
in the renunciation of every intellectual and dogmatic self-affirmation. On the 
other hand, they are—following Waldenfels—to be found in the proclamation 
of the “Christian claim of revelation” in the faith in the “God-man Jesus,” 
and in the Catholic Church’s parallel doctrine of the Trinity, the analogia entis 
and the Christological-theological basis of the doctrine of the kenosis. In his 
description of Nishitani’s philosophy, Waldenfels charges him with not taking 
the meaning of these doctrines seriously into account.
The two directions he outlines are obviously too disparate to become a solid 
basis for dialogue, which requires something more than a mere repetition of 
the unreliable sundpoints of the past. It is probably true that a Buddhist would 
not have trouble dealing with the first type Waldenfeb describes in referring to 
the thcologia rugatioa of the mystics. But with the second, the demand to take 
“seriously” the dogmas of his church, which means for him to acknowledge 
them as he does, he contradicts what he has affirmed previously with regard 
to the first. This self-contradiction by the Christian, which the “enlightened 
Buddha” can only respond to with a “smile,” is perhaps the real reason for the 
“painful visage of the crucified Jesus,” the image with which the Jesuit writer 
finishes his book. This “modest” but also disappointing result of the author’s 
attempts to confront Christian faith and Buddhist philosophy might bring the 
representatives of both religions to the conclusion that “enlightenment which
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radiates love and love which is enlightened’’ occurs where we distinguish be­
tween “being” and “ought to be,” and take upon us a corresponding respon­
sibility. Though Waldenfels faults Buddhists for failing to accept this responsi­
bility (properly so, I think), he does so without himself accepting the 
consequences, and by shifting the burden implied in those consequences onto 
the shoulders of his Christ. By accepting the burden of personal responsibility, 
a Buddhist could no longer—as Nishitani likes to do—use Paul’s words about 
the “Christ in me” merely as a shocking koan—rather he could find in it a 
correspondence to his “becoming Buddha,” through which we would become, 
one another, Buddha or Christ. Here we would have no more to do, not only 
with nothingness or the abyss of God, but on that unfathomable depth, with 
the no less unfathomable special revelation of the transcendence in its incarna­
tion in our “becoming man,” which is a universal possibility beyond any 
doctrine or dogma, training or institution. To find such a positive solution to 
their shared problematic, Christian theology should realize the consequences of 
the failure of the biblical eschatology, which consists in the apparition of the 
church instead of the expected kingdom of God, and Buddhist philosophy 
should acknowledge that its speculations on nothingness stand in opposition to 
the Buddha’s silence.
It is with the grateful memory of the discussions I had during the past winter 
with Nishitani Keiji and others associated with the Kyoto school, that I presume 
to conclude this appraisal of Waldenfels’s book by offering an alternative to 
the dead end reached in his considerations. When we are ready to use our 
religious traditions, their mythologies and practices, in a critical manner as 
symbols for the realization of our self-understanding, we will encounter our 
transcendental destiny of being unconditionally responsible for one another. 
At such moments, for which Buddhists and Christians may use different sym­
bols, their truth could reveal itself, as Plato said, as one that “occurs between 
friends in a good hour.” In remembrance of such hours, I feel myself in the 
good company of my Buddhist friends, and I, for my part, shall try to accompany 
them to our common future.
Fritz Buri
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